



Central European
Labour Studies
Institute

SEAD: Enhancing socio-ecological dialogue in the automotive industry

Report Findings

A circular illustration in a light red, sketchy style depicting a crowd of people. The figures are simplified, with some showing heads and shoulders, others more detailed with clothing. They appear to be gathered together, possibly in a public space or a meeting.

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Introduction, Aim and Methodology

The report is prepared within the SEAD project. The report aims to help relevant employer organisations and trade unions in the Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia develop practical strategies to strengthen social dialogue and influence policies for the future of work, emerging from ongoing socio-ecological and digital transformations in the automotive industry.

The report is structured around the analytical and conceptual framework of the project and the research conducted within it between October 2025 and February 2026. In addition to desk research, which mostly involved monitoring and summarising relevant studies and articles, we developed and launched two online surveys, and conducted interviews with stakeholders and experts in the three countries, as well as at EU level.

We conducted two separate surveys: one for trade unions and employee representatives, and one for employers and employer organisations active in the automotive sector. There was a significant overlap in the questions, only a few were modified or adjusted for the target group. This was also intended to make the results comparable. One set of questions focused on the assessment of changes in production, employment and working conditions by worker representatives and employers: respondents were asked to evaluate changes on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 meant 'no change' or 'irrelevant', and 10 meant 'major change' or 'very significant'. The second set of questions covered the agenda of social dialogue and collective bargaining, the availability and sharing of transformation-related information, and the participation of respondents in the policy-making process and relevant discussions at local, regional, and national levels concerning the dual transformation. Respondents could indicate the topics on the agenda of social dialogue or the regularity of their participation. Consequently, our assessment shows how commonly employers and trade unions engaged in social dialogue in the broadest sense. Both surveys were launched in four languages: English (original), Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak. They were distributed via the networks of the trade union federations and employer organisations involved in the project.

In total, we received 102 responses, of which 75 were from trade union and employee representatives, and 32 were from employers. Respondents at the sectoral level also filled out the questionnaire, after which the number of company-based respondents shrank to 59 worker representatives and 17 employers. There were also significant differences in the composition of the two groups of respondents. The vast majority (94.9%) of worker representatives and trade union or works council members represented employees at a subsidiary of a multinational company. These were typically medium companies (45.3% with 250–1,000 employees) or large companies (38.7% with over 1,000 employees). 20% of respondents were employee representatives at OEMs and 58.7% at suppliers. In contrast, the smaller sample of employers included a significant proportion of small companies employing less than 50 workers (38.9%), slightly surpassing the proportion of respondents from both medium (27.8) and large companies (33.3%). In addition to the very small sample of employers, this significant difference in the sample does not allow for a more rigorous comparison, but only an illustrative one.

In parallel to the survey, we designed a semi-structured interview questionnaire. Following discussions with sectoral trade unions and employer organisations in Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia, we compiled a list of potential interviewees. A total of 17 interviews were conducted between December 2025 and February 2026. The interviews had both a mapping and an in-depth character; our aim was to gather more information on the perceived drivers of transformation and the challenges and opportunities of adapting to the dual transformation. A special set of questions inquired about the political context, policymaking milieu which sets conditions for the quality of, and prospects for, social dialogue.

The report is structured as follows. Section I. provides an overview of the key drivers, challenges and opportunities facing the automotive industry in the European Union and its three Central Eastern member states. For this section, we only used interviews, summarising the in-depth insights of interviewees on current processes and the stakes of transformation, particularly stressing insights at the EU level. Sections II, III, and IV combine findings from surveys and interviews. These sections summarise the impact of the dual transformation on production and employment, as well as on collective bargaining, social dialogue, and the assessment and involvement of industrial relations actors in policy-making in Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary. The findings are also enriched by discussion points and insights from the interviewees. Finally, in Section V, we provide a strategic overview based on the insights of EU-level interviewees, summarising the research findings before concluding.

I General overview and assessment: key drivers and challenges of digital and socioeconomic transformation

We held detailed discussions with selected trade union, works council, employer organisation, civil society and EU-level experts about the main drivers of technological and socioeconomic transformation. While the interviewees mostly agreed on the main drivers behind the changes shaping the prospects of the automotive industry in the EU and Central and Eastern Europe, they evaluated the significance of some factors quite differently. The commonly stated drivers of change were the shifting, shrinking or changing product markets of the automotive industry, mostly due to a loss of competitiveness (from China) or protectionist tariffs (US); changes in the value added composition of cars, which affect European carmakers negatively; changes in skill requirements; and investment in, introduction and development of production technology. Several respondents pointed out that no longer complex mechanics are decisive for car production, but battery technology and the concept of software-based cars, which is why semiconductor manufacturing is also gaining in importance within the automotive industry value chain. EU-level regulation, demographic change and changes in consumption, affordability and switching to alternatives were also mentioned. Interestingly, the significance of EU-level regulation in shaping outcomes was consistently emphasised more by employee representatives than by experts and employers. Some trade union representatives evaluated the effects of decarbonisation as more negative and significant. Transformation is difficult because several challenges are occurring simultaneously. EU automotive companies are facing a shrinking product market due to administrative reasons (e.g. the US) and competition from companies that produce only Evs.

Three interviewees also highlighted that European car manufacturers also face structural constraints due to their entrenched organisational structures. So far, they have been unable to achieve greater vertical integration (a key element of competitiveness) in the EV segment and are dependent on subcontractors for the highest value-added components (batteries and software). Traditional subcontractors, in turn, have faced even greater downward cost pressure to adjust. As one interviewee summarised: 'Suppliers are more affected than OEMs because a significant number of suppliers in Europe specialise in technologies that only exist in internal combustion engines. They have limited possibilities to diversify their production. Suppliers are also suffering because, in order to secure their margins, European carmakers have tended to offset losses by reducing production costs through sourcing from low-cost countries... preferring to globalise their supply strategies.' Chinese companies typically have been faster in coming up with cheaper solutions, which may imply further shrinking of the EU automotive supply chain and automotive production altogether. A further challenge for European automotive companies has been securing qualified labour and engaging in more experimental, innovative and higher-value investments. Relocations have also occurred from the EU to Asia, with the cost of production, proximity to (growing) product markets and geopolitical insecurity and suppliers featuring as key factors in relocation decisions. This has led to the reorganization of production within companies and ecosystems.

In the CEE context, questions and bottlenecks related to increasing productivity were also mentioned, which were pegged to new types of high-tech investments, but also challenges on the labour market due to negative demographic trends, but also skill mismatch.

Given all these factors, as one interviewee pointed out critically, the framing the green transition as the main reason of the crisis is incorrect and unjust, and hides the fact that main EU based car manufacturers tend to pass the blame for their loss of competitiveness on external actors, especially EU level regulators:

"Manufacturers were] consistently arguing and pushing for less regulation at EU level, for slower transformation, for more time, for flexibilities, which they successfully argued for last year, which has left itself exposed to competition from the Chinese sector for electrification in our own market".

Perspectively, all EU level respondents agreed that the drive of electromobility strengthened globally and it is irreversible, and further postponements do not do good to the industry. They mostly agreed that automotives or a broader mobility industry need to find a new production base and product market in the EU itself. Currently, even market shares of European producers within the EU product market were falling. Besides business innovation, investment and experimentation in the higher value added activities, questions of consumption – affordability of products were also raised as key. Experts disagreed to a degree in the extent to which European automotives need a more radical or rather incremental restart. One interviewee stressed that a more radical restart is needed: and that EU based producers need to find new competences, and halt the export-oriented model of development until these are found. Realistically less cars, less production, less people in production but developing new products – and production facilities, e.g. bike factories . Moreover, the entire supply chain was established in the EU, starting with mining and raw material production in Europe.

Interviewees from Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia assessed the transformation, and pace of change as relatively slow, especially for those who were informed about the scale changes happening in high wage countries. The European Union was considered by many to be the key regulator, especially by trade union interviewees. Various policies and deadlines mean that both employers and trade unions mostly react to an externally set

framework rather than co-shaping it. Besides EU regulation many respondents emphasised lack of power in terms of investment decisions. Nevertheless, as a region which was half-way to relocations outside of Europe: labour costs and availability of competent workforce still attracted investments in the region, but on a much smaller scale than overseas. CEE could not compete with available ecosystems, product markets, the infrastructure and the sheer number of annually trained specialised engineers or IT specialists in countries like India or China.

Evolution of employment in the sector underpins such evaluations. Up until 2024 employment in automotives in the Visegrad 3 fell from the 2019 level, but relatively to the EU remained very high. The following two figures show the absolute number of jobs in statistically defined automotives (Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers) and the share of employment in the European Union.

Employment in manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers in the Visegrad 3, 2008-2024 (year, thousands o...

Source: Eurostat




Figure 1. The evolution of jobs in automotives in Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia and cumulatively

Figure 1. Points out that the peak in employment was in 2019, after which employment slightly fell and stagnated at the employment level of 2015-2016.

Employment share of the Visegrad 3 in EU 27 , manufacturing of motor vehicles... (year, %)

Source: Eurostat




Figure 2. The weight of the automotive industry in Visegrad 3 compared to EU 27

As Figure 2 shows, the relative weight of employment in Visegrad 3 compared to employment in the sector in the EU increased up until 2022, to 17%, and fell back to 2015-2021 level of more than 15%. Such a state of play indicates two issues: the expansion of the sector came to a clear halt, and second, the weight of the sector in terms of employment is still relatively stable.

As the International Federation of Robotics reports, In the immediate aftermath of the Covid-19 crisis, from 2022 to 2023 industrial robot installations in Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia happened more intensively than in the rest of EU, especially in the automotive industry. In Slovakia 2,174 units were installed (48% increase) in Hungary 1,657 units, (31% increase). IFR (IFR 2024, See also Drahekoupil 2020:10) The same IFR reports adds that these significant investments occurred partly as postponed projects were finished, and the nearshoring movement in the EU strengthened the region's demand for robots. Altogether, these reports suggest that investment in industrial robots was continuous and more gradual in the region.

In the following we present results of the survey, combined with insights from national stakeholders.


II Ongoing changes in production and employment: technological innovation and new green products

In general, the assessment of interviewees from the three Visegrad countries was that companies had been gradually automating production based on old technology up until the point at which such production remained profitable and the initial investment in machinery was utilised. It was only after this that companies

would decide to invest in entirely new production lines based on new technology or establish entirely new sites. (HU 4, HU 2)

Extent of changes in production due to digitalisation and automatisatisation

scale 0 - 10, n = 59, 17



Graph no. 1 Assessment by employee representatives and employers of changes in production due to digitalisation and automation

Both employers and worker representatives evaluated the greatest effects of digitalisation and automation to be on productivity: 6.94 for employers and 6.03 for worker representatives. The other effects evaluated as medium-significant, with little difference between employers' and trade unions' assessments, were higher production flexibility, reorganisation of logistics, problems of starting production of a new product, integration of digital quality control, shift to robotic operations and growing need for data integration, with scores consistently between 4.24 and 5.65.

There was little difference of opinion between employers and workers' representatives regarding the impact of digitalisation and automation on employment. However, employers tended to frame transformation primarily as a technical and organisational process enhancing productivity, flexibility and logistical efficiency, and as a necessary response to global competition. The greatest change was observed in terms of skill requirements and shortages of skilled workers. As Graph No. 2 shows, this issue was considered significant, especially by employers, who assessed the lack of qualified personnel as 6.27 on a scale from 0 to 10. Trade unions, by contrast, more strongly emphasised the reduction of manual jobs, growing pressure for reskilling, particularly among older workers, and persistent uncertainty linked to limited information and low predictability of upcoming changes. Conversely, trade unions considered the effect on employment to be somewhat more significant, with blue-collar jobs being cut and fewer white-collar positions being introduced.

Assessment of changes in employment due to digitalisation and automatisisation

weighted average on scale: 0-10, n=59, 17



Graph no. 2. Employers' and worker representatives' assessment of changes on employment due to digitalisation and automatisisation


All interviewees mentioned skill shortages and the issue of requalification as significant challenges for the EU- and national-level automotive industries. The EU automotive sector suffers from a shortage of qualified workers. Improving the skills of the workforce could create a bottleneck for the further development of the automotive sector and its sustainability (EU2, referring to the 2026 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report).

Reskilling poses a far greater challenge. One interviewee highlighted that as of 2025 the Boston Consulting Group assessment, 2.4 million workers would need retraining. The relevant policies are designed at the level of the member states, whereas the skill challenge is at the national level of the member states. Retraining involves the issue of partnerships between companies, social partners, and public authorities. Several respondents additionally stressed that they expect stronger support and targeted intervention from national governments in this area.

The effects of decarbonisation, such as the introduction of 'green' products or production technologies, were considered less significant by both parties, especially employers. Worker representatives consistently assessed the impact as more significant in terms of both changes in production and employment security. Nevertheless, changes were considered to range relatively widely, from 3.9 to 4.4.

Assessment of decarbonisation effects on production and employment

weighted average 0-10, n= 59, 14



Graph No. 3: Assessment by employers and worker representatives of the impact of decarbonisation on production and employment within their company (on a scale of 0–10, from low to high).

The effects of decarbonisation on employment and production were considered modest. Typically, trade unions and other worker representatives considered these effects to be significantly more important than employers did. Nevertheless, both production changes and employment insecurity or loss were evaluated between 3.97 (employment contraction) and 4.49 (employment insecurity), whereas employers evaluated them between 2.53 (assembly line reorganization) and 3.35 (pressure to find new contractors).

Interestingly, employers considered the impact of technological change on working conditions to be somewhat greater than worker representatives did. According to employers, the most significant change was in the area of internal work organisation and division of labour (6.2). Both parties considered work to be somewhat less physically demanding but more psychologically demanding, with employers assessing the impact of change as slightly higher than worker representatives did. Finally, according to respondents from both groups, changes to working time allocation and contracting practices were the least significant.

Experts also stressed contraction in employment in the automotive sector, but this was more concentrated in the traditional internal combustion engine-dominated segment among European carmakers. Most interviewees agreed that the groups most affected were those with low or medium qualifications, and those over 50. However, they added that jobs in countries with high wages and high social contributions were more at risk than those in Central and Eastern Europe, which enjoyed a comparative labour cost advantage during this period.

Jobs are under threat, too. Automotive producers and suppliers typically react to a decrease in sales and a shrinking product market by putting pressure on costs. They could limit investment in research and development, but a more common approach has been to reduce labour costs. However, due to an aging population, some companies do a lot to retain loyal workers, especially those willing to retrain, as it is difficult to attract new workers. Nevertheless, companies' willingness to retain workers decreased after the Covid-19 crisis. (HU 4)

With few exceptions (HU 1) interviewees confirmed that there were no massive job losses. The dominant trend is transformation of job content rather than job destruction, with problems often being addressed through internal organisational adjustments and redeployment of workers. Respondents at company level in workplaces with existing industrial relations structures were particularly open to change. They observed changes attentively, but without alarm. (CZ4, HU3)

Assessment of digitalisation and automatisisation on working conditions

weighted average scale 0-10, n= 59, 14



Graph no. 4 Worker representatives and employers assessment of technological changes on working conditions

Worker representatives and employers evaluated the effects of digitalisation and automation (e.g. new software, platforms, robotics and AI-driven production) on working conditions in their company or sector as being relatively significant. While the two parties' estimates were similar with regard to the extent of changes to physical and psychological work, they differed more markedly in terms of the organisation of work, changes in contracting practices and changes in working time allocation. Interestingly, employers assessed the impact of changes as being somewhat more significant in all areas.

For respondents who were worker representatives from Slovakia and Hungary, changes in working time allocation were identified as having the greatest impact. Czech respondents more often emphasised changes in work organisation and the increasing cognitive demands of work.

III Collective bargaining and social dialogue

Of all the companies surveyed, only one respondent indicated that there is a collective bargaining clause in the company-level agreement containing a provision on digitalisation or decarbonisation. This indicates the general weakness of the regulation of dual transformation in the analysed countries. Compared to other EU member states, industrial relations in the Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia lacked a co-management component at the sectoral and national levels that could have formed an important basis for tackling the


challenges of the dual transition. In other words, decentralised, company-based industrial relations have created a systematic weakness in addressing the transformation. Furthermore, as one interviewee pointed out, social dialogue does not function as a genuine platform for shaping transformation strategies; decisions are usually driven by market pressures and political agendas. (CZ2)

As sharing information is a necessary component of social dialogue, the survey also inquired about information provided and received related to the dual transformation.

Regarding topics related to transformation at company level, there was a significant difference in the evaluation of shared or received information between employers and worker representatives. The majority of worker representatives considered that company representatives inform them only partly or irregularly (51%; employers: 29.4%), while the majority of employers (53%; trade unions: 34%) said that they provide information regularly. Notably, a significant proportion of respondents — 15.6% of worker representatives and 5.9% of employers — answered that they neither provide nor receive information related to the company's transformation.

We provide/receive information regularly related to transformation


n= 59, 14



Graph No. 5. Regularity of information sharing and receiving

Dominant channels of dissemination of information to workers

up to 2 options available, percentage, n=14




Graph no. 6. Employers' dominant channel of information sharing with workers

As Graph No. 6 shows, surveyed employers predominantly used three channels for disseminating information: the most popular were communicating with employees via lower-level management (58%), holding a direct forum/meeting with all employees (50%), and publishing a company newsletter.

Overall, trade unions and worker representatives indicated that they received a greater share of information from workers' councils. There was also significant variation among respondents by country. In terms of access to information about the transformation, Hungarian respondents reported a better level of access than those in the Czechia and Slovakia, who reported a similar level.

Sources of information on company level transformation - worker representatives

percentage, n=59



Graph no. 7 shows the dominant sources of information for worker representatives.

For Slovak worker representatives, company/plant management was the only dominant source of information, whereas for respondents from Czechia and Hungary, other sources were also very significant. 40% of Hungarian respondents mentioned works councils, and 40% mentioned trade union federations/confederations, while 33% of respondents from Czechia mentioned trade union federations/confederations as a relevant source of information.

Access to information about transformation: Hungarian worker representatives reported better access to information related to transformation than their counterparts in Czechia and Slovakia. Hungarian interviews also emphasised the important role of works councils and European works councils in receiving relevant information. Interviewees stated that cooperation with trade unions and other stakeholders is stable, but largely focused on operational issues rather than strategic planning. Social dialogue mainly exists at company level, focusing on wages, working conditions and immediate workplace concerns.

In general, the common interest is to produce as much as possible and make a profit. Strategic decisions about production models, technological investments or long-term direction are typically taken at the global corporate level, which limits the role of local actors, including employers, in shaping the outcomes of transformation.

Nevertheless, several topics related to transformation were on the agenda of social dialogue, but not all of them.

Current transformation related topics on the agenda of social dialogue or consultations

percentage, n = 59, 17



Graph No. 8: Employers' and worker representatives' assessment of topics that feature in company-level social dialogue

For worker representatives, the most significant topics were sharing information on company investments in renewable energy (40%), and around a quarter of respondents also indicated the provision of training for temporary workers, short-term solutions to skill needs and the hiring of workers with the necessary skills.

Around a quarter of employers indicated that social dialogue encompasses overall employment levels, training and requalification, training needs, the introduction of lifelong learning, the cost implications of transformation, and investments in renewables.

The survey revealed the clearest country-level differences in terms of the quality and scope of the current political and societal debate surrounding green policies. In Czechia, the middle answer ('mixed') clearly dominates. In Slovakia, responses were more evenly divided between 'mixed' and 'mostly negative'. The distribution in Hungary is the most balanced across all three options — positive, mixed and negative — making the Hungarian responses the most polarised.


In Hungary, ambivalent views clearly dominate, whereas in Czechia, ambivalent views dominate slightly, although a sceptical position is also noticeable. In Slovakia, responses are almost evenly distributed between supportive, ambivalent and sceptical positions.

IV. Political and social levels: biased interaction and involvement

Respondents in all three countries reported polarised discourse and an insufficient flow of information, particularly in Hungary. Only a minority of respondents regularly participated in events and sessions related to dual transformation at the national, regional or local levels. However, employers participated significantly more often.

Attendance of local sessions, events on transformation

percentage, n=59, 17



Graph No. 9 Presence of employers and worker representatives in national, regional and local sessions dealing with the dual transformation

Worker representatives expressed scepticism about the ability of unions to influence the overall direction of the transformation, citing technological solutions and corporate priorities that fail to address social inequalities adequately (SK2, CZ2, NGO). Some were more critical of green policies. They are critical of policies that appear disconnected from social realities or lack clear support measures for workers. The framing of transformation as a threat to European industry is becoming more visible, reflecting broader concerns about competitiveness and employment. (CZ1).

In general, interviewees generally indicated that broader political debates and polarised societal narratives surrounding transformation barely reach, if at all, social dialogue and information exchange at the plant level. Workers tend to approach ongoing changes pragmatically and with a degree of indifference, focusing primarily on immediate workplace realities rather than national political discourses. Therefore the wider contexts were not seen as shaping collective bargaining agendas or the day-to-day functioning of social dialogue. At the same time, one NGO respondent argued that growing societal backlash against green policies reflects the perception that transformation has not yet delivered tangible benefits for ordinary workers. Instead, public resources and subsidies are often viewed as disproportionately benefiting large corporations. Interviewees also pointed to limited cooperation between social partners and NGOs in addressing digital and socio-economic transformation challenges.

V. Strategic outlook and conclusion


Interviewees stressed what was mentioned in several reports (Galgóczy 2025, Eurofund, 2025) :the competences of the EU automotive sector need to be developed. The strategy is to develop and bring high-value activities to the EU, rather than low-value activities, and to avoid relocating high-value activities outside the EU.

The majority of worker representatives (63%) and employers (86.7%) indicated that skills and training are the most important issue for strategic planning. The two groups of respondents diverged on other matters: employment/job security and health and safety were important issues for trade unions (54.4%), while green investments (46.7%) and innovation, research and development (40%) were important issues for a significant proportion of employers. Surprisingly, work organisation and flexibility were not prioritised. This may be because production and employment in all three countries were already considered to be highly flexible.

Three topics emerged as dominant for worker representatives from the three countries: security and job transitions, skills and training, and health and safety. However, job security and job transitions were the most important issue for respondents from Slovakia, while those from Hungary prioritised skills and training. Meanwhile, respondents from Czechia considered health and safety and skills to be the most important issues.

Prioritised areas for strategic planning

percentage, n = 59, 15



Graph no. 10. Strategic priorities, social dialogue issues for surveyed employers and worker representatives

There has been a change in the skills profiles needed in the sector, with less demand for low-skilled workers and those with low or medium qualifications, and more demand for higher-qualified workers, such as engineers, IT specialists and software specialists.

The potential of in-house training was evaluated differently: one interviewee considered the question to be massive. Most interviewees from Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia considered it to be very important, but some also stated that a generational change is needed, where digital skills are basic competencies, but there is a need for more skilled employees and hubs where new skills could be developed.

The strategy should be to attract and retain high-value activities and not to relocate them outside the EU due to low production costs. It is also important not to attract low-value-added investments from outside the EU, but rather to attract those with high added value. Social conditionality should be in place to prevent sweatshops in the EU and authoritarian productive models, and to promote IR and industrial democracy.

At the EU level, experts agreed that there will be no return to production based on combustion engines and that the agenda is set. A greater restart should be considered to develop new core competencies in line with the degrowth agenda and decarbonisation. Two experts stressed the need for a greater focus on developing production in the broader, greener mobility industry and employment in internal and eventually external product markets for green mobility. The other two experts seemed to consider incremental and gradual changes within existing production structures more likely.

The importance of social dialogue and industrial relations was stressed as very important in crisis management. As an expert highlighted:

“If we want to maintain widespread public support for the policy objectives agreed by the EU and its member states, we need to have strong industrial relations because those objectives will impact many areas. The core business of industrial relations is affected. They impact working conditions. It affects the organisation of work.

They impact the skills and training needs. They also impact occupational health and safety, introducing new risks and hazards. Social dialogue and industrial relations are really a must have to make the transition successful from an economic perspective, from a social perspective, and from an environmental perspective. Otherwise, workers will see those changes as a threat, as something which is completely disruptive for, for their well-being, for, for social cohesion. And there will be a strong pushback and there is already a strong pushback.” (EU 2)

The main findings of our research is that industrial relations in Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia, as compared to other EU member states, were missing a co-management element at both the sectoral and national levels—an element that could have served as a crucial foundation for addressing the challenges posed by the dual transition. Decentralised, company-based industrial relations have resulted in a systematic weakness to deal with the transformation. Our report highlighted that employers and trade unions too were interested to scale up social dialogue on several key topics, especially related to skill formation, retraining, but also organisation of work. Information sharing and further discussions are highly required on sectoral, regional and national levels. Thus, it is necessary to extend the agenda and intensify the discussion on skill formation and requalification among social partners. To do so, all available channels must be used at the national, sectoral, and local levels.

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
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